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Evolution, Science, and Ideology:  
Why the Establishment Clause Requires 
Neutrality in Science Classes 
 
Stephen W. Trask* 
INTRODUCTION 
Public education is often considered to be one of the most be-
nign aspects of state power.  Many people question how such a 
benevolent institution could be labeled as coercive when it rarely 
even engages in corporal punishment.  It is the dominance of this 
assumption in society that allows compulsory public education to 
conceal its considerable coercive power.  The source of this power 
is the inherent capacity of public education to shape how stu-
dents view the world.  Both the public education system and the 
elites who influence it use this power to serve their own ideologi-
cal ends.  One of the best examples of this ideological coercion is 
the choice of public schools to teach evolutionary theory as the 
exclusive explanation for the origin of life.  Both public schools 
and federal courts justify the failure to teach alternatives with 
the claim that evolutionism is the only scientific explanation for 
the origin of life.  In reality, alternatives to evolutionary theory 
are only unscientific to the extent that one relies on a secular 
definition of the scientific method.  Relying on a slanted defini-
tion of science will inevitably produce a rigged game when one 
determines whether a theory is scientific.  
Although some school districts and legislatures have at-
tempted to solve this problem, the federal courts have used the 
Establishment Clause to obstruct all attempts at reform.  The 
underlying cause of this situation is both philosophical and legal.  
Flawed epistemological assumptions have produced flawed legal 
reasoning.  Because the problem has two sources, the solution 
must also have two aspects.  First, people should recognize that 
the definition of science, which is legitimizing the exclusion of al-
ternatives to evolutionary theory, is ideological.  Second, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should hold that the failure to teach alternatives 
 
* J.D. 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. 2003, Liberty University.  I would 
like to thank Professor Russell Pannier, Jeremy Samek, and Josiah Neeley for assisting 
with this article. 
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to evolutionary theory in public school science classes is an estab-
lishment of religion under the First Amendment.  Section I of 
this paper will analyze the false epistemological assumptions 
that are legitimizing the indoctrination of students into evolu-
tionary theory.  Section II will examine Establishment Clause 
cases that have dealt with evolutionism.  Section III will discuss 
why the exclusive teaching of evolutionism in public schools vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. 
I.  UNMASKING SECULAR HUMANISM 
Nearly all public schools teach evolutionism without incorpo-
rating alternatives to evolutionism into the curriculum.1  In order 
to address the legal errors that have produced this situation, it is 
first necessary to address the epistemological errors that are jus-
tifying the exclusion of alternatives to evolutionary theory from 
public school science classes.  Some late twentieth-century phi-
losophers examined the role that knowledge can play in justify-
ing the exclusion of non-conforming belief systems.  An explora-
tion of the thought of these philosophers will offer some insight 
into the logic that has legitimized the exclusion of alternatives to 
evolutionism.   
The search for truth is not always an objective inquiry.  Mi-
chel Foucault has argued: 
If we truly wish to know knowledge . . . we must look not to philoso-
phers but to politicians—we need to understand what the relations of 
struggle and power are.  One can understand what knowledge consists 
of only by examining these relations of struggle and power, the man-
ner in which things and men hate one another, fight one another, and 
try to dominate one another, to exercise power relations over one an-
other.2 
The search for truth is not always an innocent pursuit; it can also 
be a power struggle.  The ability to determine what truth is can 
place a person or group of people in a position of social domi-
nance.  According to Foucault, every society has a politics of 
truth, which determines what forms of discourse will be accepted 
 
 1 See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982).  
The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) . . . . developed a series of bi-
ology texts which, although emphasizing different aspects of biology, incorpo-
rated the theory of evolution as a major theme.  The success of the BSCS effort 
is shown by the fact that fifty percent of American school children currently 
use BSCS books directly and the curriculum is incorporated indirectly in virtu-
ally all biology texts. 
Id.  
 2 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Juridical Forms, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF 
FOUCAULT 1954–1984: POWER 1, 12 (Paul Rainbow & James D. Faubion eds., Robert Hur-
ley et al. trans., The New Press 2000) (1994). 
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as truth.3  This politics of truth includes the methods that people 
will use to define truth and what people will be responsible for 
making determinations concerning the nature of truth.4  This 
politics of truth that exists in a society at any given time is not 
something that the state must enforce, since embedded power re-
lations in culture “permeate the whole fabric of our existence.”5  
Power is not always bad, but it is always dangerous, and it is im-
portant to understand the world through cautious investigation 
that takes into account the dangers of truth and power.6 
Logical Positivism, an early twentieth-century philosophical 
movement, strongly influenced the epistemological methods that 
exist in the scientific community today.7  A.J. Ayer was probably 
the best-known proponent of Logical Positivism.  He argued that 
in order for a statement to be meaningful, it must be verifiable.8  
The necessary condition of whether a statement is factually sig-
nificant is whether some observation could affirm or deny the 
truth of the statement.9 
We enquire in every case what observations would lead us to answer 
the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we 
must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far 
as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its 
grammatical appearance may suggest that it does.10 
Therefore, under Ayer’s definition of science, a statement 
that refers to the “purposeful complexity of the universe as evi-
dence for the existence of God” would be an incoherent statement 
since no possible observation could directly affirm or deny the ex-
istence of God.11 
Jean-François Lyotard has written about the role that the 
 
 3 See 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF 
FOUCAULT 1954–1984: POWER, supra note 2, at 111, 131.  
Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth—that is, the 
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means 
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in 
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true. 
Id.  
 4 Id. 
 5 FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 17. 
 6 See Colin Gordon, Introduction to 3 THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT 1954–
1984: POWER, supra note 2, at xi, xix. 
 7 See infra notes 63–64, 137–144 and accompanying text. 
 8 ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH & LOGIC 35 (Dover Publications 1952) 
(1936). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 115 (“For to say that ‘God exists’ is to make a metaphysical utterance which 
cannot be either true or false.  And by the same criterion, no sentence which purports to 
describe the nature of a transcendent god can possess any literal significance.”). 
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scientific epistemology can play in legitimizing exclusion.  He ar-
gues that scientific epistemologies are language games12 since 
there are rules or constraints that establish what forms of dis-
course a person can use in the process of fulfilling the require-
ments of the game.13  The dominant definition of science in the 
scientific community is such a language game because it estab-
lishes the rules or constraints that one must follow to arrive at 
truth.14  Science is simply descriptive statements that are limited 
by two constraints15: the descriptive statements must be open to 
explicit observation, and they must be subject to review by scien-
tific experts.16 
Scientific epistemologies, like Logical Positivism, legitimize 
the exclusion of those who do not understand truth exclusively 
through empirical verification.  “The scientist questions the va-
lidity of narrative statements and concludes that they are never 
subject to argumentation or proof.  He classifies them as belong-
ing to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, 
backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs, authority, 
prejudice, ignorance, ideology.”17  The state excludes any theory 
that has a supernatural element under the assumption that such 
statements must inevitably rely on subjective faith instead of ob-
jective proof.18  Therefore, those who do not define truth exclu-
 
 12 See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON 
KNOWLEDGE  3, 9–11 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minnesota 
Press 1984) (1979). 
 13 Id. at 10.  
Wittgenstein . . . focuses his attention on the effects of different modes of dis-
course; he calls the various types of utterances he identifies along the 
way . . . language games. . . .  [E]ach of the various categories of utterance can 
be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which 
they can be put—in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a 
set of rules determining the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the 
proper way to move them. 
Id.  Wittgenstein gave these linguistics the title “language games,” and Lyotard developed 
the idea further, applying it to scientific epistemologies. 
 14 Id. at 18 (Science is “composed of denotative statements, but imposes two supple-
mentary conditions on their acceptability: the objects to which they refer must be avail-
able . . . in explicit conditions of observation; and it must be possible to decide whether or 
not a given statement pertains to the language judged relevant by the experts.”).  Id. at 24 
(“These two rules underlie what nineteenth-century science calls verification and twenti-
eth-century science, falsification.”). 
 15 Id. at 18. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 27. 
 18 Introduction to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, at xx–xxi (Michael 
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (“A second source of the resistance, we think, is a throw-
back to the modern or ‘scientific’ period of legal thought. . . .  Religion is subjective, and 
science is objective.”); Iain T. Benson, Notes Towards a (Re)Definition of the “Secular”, 33 
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 519, 520 (2000).  
The term ‘secular’ has come to mean a realm that is neutral or, more precisely, 
‘religion-free.’  Implicit in this religion free neutrality is the notion that the 
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sively through the process of scientific verification often experi-
ence marginalization. 
The hegemony of scientific knowledge production becomes 
even more problematic given that this form of knowledge re-
quires as much faith as belief in the supernatural.  Lyotard ar-
gues that science is facing a major crisis of legitimation because 
of epistemological problems that result from its inability to dem-
onstrate the legitimacy of its method.19  Two problems would re-
sult if science attempted to legitimize itself.  First, it would rely 
on circular reasoning, which would violate the very principles 
that govern rational inquiry in the scientific discipline.20  Second, 
science cannot prove through the senses alone that all true 
knowledge must be directly accessible to the senses since, if there 
were either forms of knowledge or elements of reality that were 
inaccessible to the senses, the senses, by definition, would be un-
able to detect those forms of knowledge or elements of reality.21  
Therefore, since science cannot confer legitimacy upon itself, it is 
inevitable that science will seek legitimation using narrative 
knowledge.22  It will seek to tell the epic stories of scientific dis-
coveries in order to confer legitimacy on its method.23  However, 
the problem with using narrative as a function of legitimation is 
that the foundation of science becomes a form of knowledge that 
science believes is inferior, backward, and worthless.24  The sci-
entific epistemology is slowly collapsing under its own uncondi-
tional demands for proof.  The positivistic view of the scientific 
 
secular is a realm of facts distinct from the realm of faith. . . .  States cannot be 
neutral towards metaphysical claims.  Their very inaction towards certain 
claims operates as an affirmation of others. . . .  The often anti-religious stance 
embodied in secularism excludes and banishes religion from any practical place 
in culture.   
Id.  The term “faith” refers to a belief that does not rely on proof. 
 19 LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 27–28.  
Before it came to this point (what some call positivism), scientific knowledge 
sought other solutions.  It is remarkable that for a long time it could not help 
resorting for its solutions to procedures that, overtly or not, belong to narrative 
knowledge. . . .  It is not inconceivable that the recourse to narrative is inevita-
ble, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its state-
ments to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its 
own. 
Id.  
 20 Id. at 29 (“Without such recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its 
own validity and would be stooping to what it condemns: begging the question, proceeding 
on prejudice.”). 
 21 See id. (“It is recognized that the conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of 
the game of science, are immanent in that game . . . .”). 
 22 Id.  The term “narrative knowledge” refers to a belief that does not rely on proof. 
 23 Id. at 28. 
 24 Id. at 29 (“Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true 
knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its 
point of view is no knowledge at all.”). 
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method is a faith-based principle. 
Some practical implications for science classes emanate from 
these philosophical principles.  The object of study in science 
classes should be anything in the universe that a person can 
study through the five senses.  Therefore, revealed texts in which 
some people find authority are not within the realm of scientific 
study.  This is not because such religious texts are necessarily in-
ferior to scientific study—they are just two different topical areas 
of study.  This does not mean that science classes can exclude 
any idea relating to the supernatural.  There are two possible 
approaches to the scientific method.  One studies reality through 
the senses in both approaches.  The point of tension between the 
two methods concerns what inferences one can draw from sen-
sory experience.  The materialistic approach (Logical Positivism) 
to the scientific method would not allow a person to infer super-
natural explanations from the sensible world.  The non-
materialistic approach to the scientific method would allow a 
person to infer supernatural explanations from sensory experi-
ence.  Science classes should teach students about both of these 
approaches to the scientific method because neither has a supe-
rior claim to proof and both entail faith.25 
The current indoctrination in science classes is the result of 
a failure to teach both approaches.26  Public schools and the 
courts have argued that the materialistic scientific method is the 
only scientific method.27  When one operates under this assump-
tion, the exclusion of alternatives to evolutionary theory from the 
curriculum becomes inevitable since only theories that are exclu-
sively materialistic in their inferences are legitimate scientific 
theories.  Other explanations relating to the origin of life are ex-
cluded, by definition, since these theories include supernatural 
inferences about the material world.  As was previously dis-
cussed, both of these methods require faith.  However, public 
schools and the courts arbitrarily exclude and indoctrinate people 
who subscribe to the non-materialistic scientific method.28  Only 
recognition of the faith-based assumptions inherent in each of 
 
 25 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Benson, supra note 18, at 520 (“[A] properly constituted secular government 
(non-sectarian not non-faith) will see as necessary the due accommodation of religiously 
informed beliefs from a variety of cultures.”). 
 27 See, e.g., McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267–68, 1272 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735–38 (M.D. Pa. 
2005). 
 28 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987); McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 
1267–68, 1272; Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 346–48 (5th Cir. 
1999); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735–38; Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. 
Supp. 1208, 1210–11 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 
517, 521–22 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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these methodologies will end the ideological exclusion and op-
pression.29 
The ultimate implication of exclusively teaching the materi-
alistic approach to the scientific method is that the state is forci-
bly indoctrinating students into the religion of secular human-
ism.  According to the Council for Secular Humanism, “Secular 
humanism . . . is a philosophy and world view which centers upon 
human concerns and employs rational and scientific methods to 
address the wide range of issues important to us all.”30  Elements 
of the secular humanist belief system include: use of reason and 
science to understand the universe and solve problems,31 dis-
couraging supernatural understandings of reality,32 protecting 
the Earth for the good of other species and future generations,33 
skepticism toward untested knowledge,34 belief in common moral 
decency,35 separation of church and state,36 belief in agnosticism 
or atheism,37 belief in naturalism (i.e., no supernatural realm),38 
belief that evolutionary theory is strongly supported by the evi-
dence,39 and opposition to creationism in science classes.40  The 
beliefs of the religion of secular humanism emerge logically and 
 
 29 Benson, supra note 18, at 521 (“What can advertise itself as neutral is often any-
thing but . . . . Until the necessarily ‘implicit faiths’ are acknowledged, explicit faiths are 
at a marked disadvantage in finding any place in the public sphere, including: politics, 
public education, and law itself.”). 
 30 Council for Secular Humanism, What is Secular Humanism?, 
http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=what (last visited Oct. 
2, 2006). 
 31 Council for Secular Humanism, The Affirmations of Humanism: A Statement of 
Principles, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=main&page=affirmations 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006) (“We are committed to the application of reason and science to 
the understanding of the universe and to the solving of human problems.”). 
 32 Id. (“We deplore efforts to denigrate human intelligence, to seek to explain the 
world in supernatural terms, and to look outside nature for salvation.”). 
 33 Id. (“We want to protect and enhance the earth, to preserve it for future genera-
tions, and to avoid inflicting needless suffering on other species.”). 
 34 Id. (“We are skeptical of untested claims to knowledge . . . .”). 
 35 Id. (“We believe in the common moral decencies: altruism, integrity, honesty, 
truthfulness, responsibility.  Humanist ethics is amenable to critical, rational guidance.  
There are normative standards that we discover together.  Moral principles are tested by 
their consequences.”). 
 36 Id. (“We are committed to the principle of the separation of church and state.”). 
 37 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 30 (“Secular humanists are generally 
nontheists.  They typically describe themselves as nonreligious.”). 
 38 Id. (“Secular humanists accept a world view or philosophy called naturalism, in 
which the physical laws of the universe are not superseded by non-material or supernatu-
ral entities . . . .”). 
 39 PAUL KURTZ, A SECULAR HUMANIST DECLARATION 21 (1980), (“[E]volution of the 
species is supported so strongly by the weight of evidence that it is difficult to reject it.”). 
 40 Id. (“[W]e deplore the efforts by fundamentalists (especially in the United States) 
to invade the science classrooms, requiring that creationist theory be taught to students 
and requiring that it be included in biology textbooks.”).  This is particularly interesting 
since secular humanists apparently want to mix their religious beliefs with politics, and, 
more specifically, to prohibit the teaching of other religious beliefs that conflict with their 
religious beliefs. 
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necessarily from the materialistic scientific method.41 
II.  CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LAW ON EVOLUTION 
A.  Epperson v. Arkansas 
In 1968, the Supreme Court heard the case Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, which was its first Establishment Clause case dealing 
with evolutionism.42  A 1928 Arkansas statute prohibited Arkan-
sas public schools and universities from teaching the theory that 
people evolved from other species.43  The Arkansas statute was a 
product of religious fundamentalist opposition to evolutionism in 
the 1920s.44  The statute modeled the Tennessee law that was the 
subject of the famous Scopes case.45  The Court held that the 
statute violated the “constitutional prohibition of state laws re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof.”46  The Arkansas law prohibited one scientific theory 
out of the entire scientific discipline because the law conflicted 
with a religious group’s interpretation of Genesis.47  “The First 
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion 
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”48  The Ar-
kansas law failed the neutrality standard because it did not pro-
hibit all teaching concerning the origin of life.49  Instead, the law 
targeted a specific theory that conflicted with the Bible.50 
B.  McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 
In 1982, the Federal District Court in the Eastern District of 
Arkansas heard the case McLean v. Arkansas Board of Educa-
tion, which dealt with a recently passed Arkansas act that re-
quired public schools to give equal treatment to creation science 
and evolution science.51  The major issue in this case was 
whether the act violated the Establishment Clause,52 and the 
court applied the Lemon Test to make this determination.53  The 
Lemon Test has the following three prongs: “First, the statute 
 
 41 A.J. Ayer endorsed the Secular Humanist Declaration that the Council for Secular 
Humanism issued in 1980.  Id. at 28.  This provides strong evidence for the link between 
logical positivism and secular humanism. 
 42 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 43 Id. at 98. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98. 
 46 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 104. 
 49 Id. at 109. 
 50 Id. 
 51 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
 52 Id. at 1257. 
 53 Id. at 1258. 
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must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.’”54  If any of these prongs is not 
satisfied, the law in question is unconstitutional.55 
The court first held that the act violated the secular purpose 
prong of the Lemon Test.56  Deference must be given to the legis-
lative purpose contained within an act, but this situation de-
manded attention to the historical context in which the act was 
implemented.57  The court looked at the legislative history of the 
act, including statements of people who supported the legislation, 
and found that its purpose was sectarian and not educational.58  
The act was nothing more than an attempt to introduce the Bib-
lical version of creation into the science curriculum.59 
The court also concluded from the language of the act that its 
purpose and effect was to advance religion.60  The definition of 
creationism used within the act implicitly referred to Genesis, 
since it mentioned sudden creation out of nothing and a world-
wide flood.61  The court concluded that the concept of creation out 
of nothing is necessarily a religious concept,62 and the major ef-
fect of the act would be to advance religious beliefs because of its 
correlation with the Genesis account.63 
The court next concluded that the act could not have any 
educational purpose because creation science was not science as 
accepted by the scientific community.64  The court held that “the 
essential characteristics of science are: (1) It is guided by natural 
law; (2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It 
is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its conclusions are 
tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and (5) It is fal-
sifiable.”65  The concept of a sudden creation out of nothing fits 
none of these characteristics of science.66  In addition, at the time 
the case was decided, not one recognized scientific journal had 
 
 54 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 55 McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1258. 
 56 Id. at 1264. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1265–66. 
 63 Id. at 1266. 
 64 Id. at 1267. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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published an article on creation theory.67  The court did not be-
lieve that “such a loose knit group of independent thinkers in all 
the varied fields of science could, or would, so effectively censor 
new scientific thought.”68  The act also violated the advancement 
of religion prong of the Lemon Test, since if creation science was 
not science, the only effect of the act would be to advance relig-
ion.69 
The McLean opinion could not be a better example of how 
the materialistic approach to the scientific method legitimizes 
the exclusion of alternatives to evolution science, such as creation 
science, from class curriculum.  The court’s appeal to the domi-
nance of the materialistic approach to the scientific method in 
the scientific community only serves to demonstrate the central 
thesis of Lyotard70: 
[T]he conditions of truth, in other words, the rules of the game of sci-
ence, are immanent in that game, . . . they can only be established 
within the bonds of a debate that is already scientific in nature, 
and . . . there is no other proof that the rules are good than the con-
sensus extended to them by the experts.71 
It should be no surprise that no peer-reviewed scientific journal 
had published an article on scientific creationism at the time that 
McLean was decided.72  It is not a scientific conspiracy that pro-
duced this result.  As Foucault pointed out, it is the “political re-
lations [that] have been established and deeply implanted in our 
culture”—“the power relations that permeate the whole fabric of 
our existence.”73  Even though reliance on both the materialistic 
and the non-materialistic approach entails faith, there is great 
risk in publishing something that runs so contrary to the norms 
of the scientific community. 
 
 67 Id. at 1268. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1272. 
 70 See supra notes 12–16, 64–68. 
 71 LYOTARD, supra note 12, at 29. 
 72 Since the time of this opinion, however, some peer-reviewed intelligent design lit-
erature has been published.   
Although open hostility from those who hold to neo-Darwinism sometimes 
makes it difficult for design scholars to gain a fair hearing for their ideas, re-
search and articles supporting intelligent design are being published in peer-
reviewed publications.  Examples of peer-reviewed books supporting design in-
clude The Design Inference (Cambridge University Press) by William Dembski, 
and Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press) by Michael Behe . . . . 
Discovery Institute, Top Questions, http://www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
 73 FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 17. 
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C.  Edwards v. Aguillard 
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case Edwards v. 
Aguillard, and addressed whether the statute in question vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.74  The State of Louisiana passed 
the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act (Creationism Act), which 
prohibited public schools from teaching evolution science unless 
accompanied by creation science.75  Public schools were not re-
quired to teach either evolutionism or creationism, but if a public 
school wanted to teach one, the act required that it also teach the 
other.76  The Supreme Court cited the Lemon Test as the legal 
standard that it would use to determine the constitutionality of 
the Creationism Act.77 
The Court noted that it must consider some distinct issues 
when applying the Establishment Clause to the unique context of 
elementary and secondary public schools.78  Although the courts 
should offer considerable deference to the decision-making of lo-
cal school districts, they still must conform to the requirements of 
the First Amendment.79  Courts must be particularly careful in 
ensuring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elemen-
tary and secondary schools because parents entrust their chil-
dren to these schools with the assumption that schools will not 
advance religious views that conflict with the private beliefs of 
the students and their families.80  There is great potential risk 
because of the compulsory nature of education and the role that 
teachers play as role models.81  The Court concluded that in “no 
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces 
than in its schools.”82 
The Court then looked to the first prong of the Lemon Test to 
 
 74 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987). 
 75 Id. at 581. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 582–83; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.  “The Lemon test has 
been applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers . . . .  
The Court based its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of the practice.”  
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 n.4. 
 78 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583–84 (“The Court has been particularly vigilant in moni-
toring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.”). 
 79 Id. at 583. 
 80 Id. at 583–84 (“Families entrust public schools with the education of their chil-
dren, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely 
be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student 
and his or her family.”). 
 81 Id. at 584 (“The State exerts great authority and coercive power through manda-
tory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role 
models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.”). 
 82 Id. (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., opinion)).  
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determine whether the actual purpose of the state was secular, 
and held that the Creationism Act lacked a secular purpose.83  
The stated purpose of the law was academic freedom, but it was 
unclear whether this meant academic freedom for the teachers to 
express or for the students to hear both sides of the issue.84  Re-
gardless of how it was interpreted, the Act did not advance either 
of these purposes.85  The Act did not advance the academic free-
dom of teachers since teachers had the freedom to teach alterna-
tives to evolutionism prior to the passage of the Act.86  It did not 
advance fairness for students for a number of reasons.87  It re-
quired development of curriculum guides for creationism but im-
posed no such requirement for evolutionism.88  The Act supplied 
resource services for creationism that it did not supply for evolu-
tionism.89  It prohibited schools from discriminating against any-
one who taught creationism, but did not forbid discrimination 
against anyone who taught evolutionism.90  The Court said that 
the goal was not to expand the science curriculum, but rather to 
discredit evolutionism by counter-balancing the teaching of evo-
lutionism with creationism at every point.91 
The Court also held that the Creationism Act had a religious 
purpose because of the historical conflict between evolutionism 
and the teachings of certain religious groups.92  The Court cited 
the Epperson v. Arkansas case as evidence for its holding.93  
Epperson involved a statute that prohibited the teaching of evo-
lutionism,94 and the Court held that it was unconstitutional to 
target and prohibit a single scientific theory about the origin of 
life because it conflicts with the Biblical teachings of religious 
groups.95  The Edwards Court concluded that the Creationism 
Act advanced the religious view that a supernatural being cre-
ated human beings.96  The primary purpose of the act was to ad-
vance a particular religious belief in violation of the First 
Amendment.97  The Court finished its opinion with the rather 
open-ended statement that “[w]e do not imply that a legislature 
 
 83 Id. at 585. 
 84 Id. at 586. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 587. 
 87 Id. at 588. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 589. 
 92 Id. at 590. 
 93 Id.; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 94 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 98. 
 95 Id. at 98, 106–07. 
 96 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591–92. 
 97 Id. at 593. 
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could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scien-
tific theories be taught.”98  However, the Court concluded that 
the Creationism Act did not accomplish this with a secular pur-
pose.99 
The reasoning of the Court in Edwards is paradoxical.  The 
Court began its opinion by discussing the great injustice that 
would occur if public schools indoctrinated students with beliefs 
that conflict with their private beliefs.100  However, the Court 
then concluded that the purpose of the Creationism Act was a 
“sham” because the supporters of the Act were religious funda-
mentalists who opposed the indoctrination of their children with 
evolutionary theory.101  One might question whether the Court 
was opposed to the indoctrination of all students, or if, instead, 
the Court was more concerned about the target of the indoctrina-
tion. 
The Court did not follow the precedent that it established in 
Epperson.  The overriding concern of Epperson was one factor—
neutrality.102  The Epperson Court held that the Arkansas stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it was not neutral toward relig-
ion.  The Court held: 
  Arkansas’ law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.  
Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and 
universities all discussion of the origin of man.  The law’s effort was 
confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its 
supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read.103 
The problem with the statute in Epperson was its lack of 
neutrality.  The government prohibited the teaching of a belief 
because it conflicted with another belief.  The Court explicitly 
stated that Arkansas could have constitutionally prohibited all 
teaching about the origin of life in public schools.104  The Crea-
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 594. 
 100 See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 101 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586–90 (“While the Court is normally deferential to a State’s 
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sin-
cere and not a sham.”). 
 102 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonre-
ligion.”). 
 103 Id. at 109. 
 104 Id. (“Arkansas’ law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality.  Arkansas 
did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the 
origin of man.”).  This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Court used a 
statement of the sponsor of the Creationism Act, where he said that he would prefer that 
schools not teach either creationism or evolutionism, as part of its reasoning for holding 
that there was no secular purpose.  Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (“Senator Keith stated: ‘My 
preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be taught.’  Such a ban on 
teaching does not promote—indeed, it undermines—the provision of a comprehensive sci-
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tionism Act at issue in Edwards achieved this neutrality since it 
simply required that schools teach either both or none.  The 
Court’s holding in Edwards conflicted with the precedent set in 
Epperson since Edwards prohibited communities from requiring 
that science classes teach creationism with evolutionism.105 
The Court also operated on the assumption that the mere in-
clusion of creationism with evolutionism in the curriculum is an 
advancement of religion and an attempt to counterbalance and 
discredit evolutionary theory at every point.106  Consider this sce-
nario: A philosophy teacher at a public high school will only teach 
proofs opposing the existence of God in his philosophy class, and 
he refuses to teach any proofs supporting the existence of God be-
cause he believes that the concept of God is religious and not phi-
losophical.  Religious fundamentalist parents at the school ex-
press their outrage that this teacher is teaching their students an 
atheistic belief system that is contrary to the Bible.  Because of 
outrage expressed by the religious parents, the school district 
passes a policy requiring that teachers give equal time to proofs 
supporting and opposing the existence of God.  How could this 
policy be constitutional under the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
Edwards?  The teacher, after all, was just teaching the students 
philosophy, and religious parents do not have a right to counter-
balance philosophical theories at every point with their personal 
religious beliefs.107  The statute lacks a secular purpose since the 
school only implemented the statute in reaction to outrage ex-
pressed by a specific religious sect,108 and including the proofs for 
the existence of God would clearly advance the religious view-
point that there is a God.109  It is simply incorrect to believe that 
presenting both sides of an issue is somehow taking sides.  Fairly 
 
entific education.”) (citations omitted). 
 105 See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97–98, 106–07.  The Supreme Court used some lan-
guage toward the end of the Edwards opinion that indicates that the Court is not foreclos-
ing the possibility of teaching alternatives to evolution.  See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 593.  
However, this is likely only an attempt by the Court to soften the impact of the opinion by 
creating an impression of moderation that probably does not exist in practice.  The rea-
soning that leads the Court to its holding in Edwards indicates that the exclusion of al-
ternatives containing supernatural explanations is likely to be near absolute.  Id. at 591–
93. 
 106 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he Act . . . has the . . . purpose of discrediting ‘evo-
lution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creation-
ism . . . .’”) (quoting Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985)); id. at 592 
(“The legislative history documents that the Act’s primary purpose was to change the sci-
ence curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular 
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety.”); id. at 593 
(“The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of 
a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.”). 
 107 Id. at 589. 
 108 Id. at 590–92. 
 109 Id. at 592–93. 
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presenting various perspectives on an issue is the essence of neu-
trality. 
The Court did not even address the argument that it is im-
portant to present both sides of an issue.  The Court sidestepped 
this argument and cited other parts of the statute that it thought 
were unfair.110  However, even if those other parts of the statute 
were unfair, that still does not address the fairness of the stat-
ute’s most important provision, which is the requirement that 
schools teach both or none.  The Court’s concern about the un-
fairness of other parts of the statute is also unfounded because 
those parts of the statute were remedial measures.  This statute 
was addressing a problem, which was the systematic exclusion of 
creationism from science classes.111  The statute required the de-
velopment of curricula for creationism because there was no such 
curriculum in existence.112  The statute correctly assumed that a 
curriculum dealing with evolutionism was already in existence.113  
The statute also attempted to correct the specific problem of dis-
crimination against creationists.114  Even if these remedial meas-
ures were unconstitutional, the Court should have merely struck 
them down instead of using them to justify striking down the 
more important parts of the statute that the legislature would 
have wanted left in place.115  These remedial measures were tan-
gential to the overriding purpose of the statute. 
 
 110 Id. at 588–89. 
 111 See id. at 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Louisiana legislators had been told re-
peatedly that creation scientists were scorned by most educators and scientists, who 
themselves had an almost religious faith in evolution.”). 
 112 Id. at 631.  
In light of the unavailability of works on creation science suitable for classroom 
use . . . and the existence of ample materials on evolution, . . . science teach-
ers . . . would need a curriculum guide on creation science, but not on evolution, 
and that those charged with developing the guide would need an easily acces-
sible group of creation scientists. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 113 See id. 
 114 Id. at 630 (“It is hardly surprising, then, that in seeking to achieve a balanced, 
‘nonindoctrinating’ curriculum, the legislators protected from discrimination only those 
teachers whom they thought were suffering from discrimination.”). 
 115 The Supreme Court has held that  
a court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is neces-
sary. . . .  “[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions 
separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to 
so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.” 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (quoting El Paso & Northeastern Ry. v. 
Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909)).  “Whether an unconstitutional provision is severable 
from the remainder of the statute in which it appears is largely a question of legislative 
intent, but the presumption is in favor of severability.”  Id. at 653. 
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D.  Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education 
In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heard 
an Establishment Clause case that dealt with the Tangipahoa 
Parish Board of Education’s requirement that teachers read a 
disclaimer before the start of any unit that would deal with the 
topic of evolutionary theory.116  The following statement was the 
required disclaimer: 
  It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of Education, 
that the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, 
is known as the Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be pre-
sented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to 
influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation or any other con-
cept.   
  It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the ba-
sic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion and 
maintain beliefs taught by parents on this very important matter of 
the origin of life and matter.  Students are urged to exercise critical 
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each 
alternative toward forming an opinion.117 
The sole issue before the court was whether the disclaimer at 
issue violated the First Amendment.118  The court concluded that 
it would apply the Lemon Test to make this determination be-
cause it was the applicable law, even though it had been the sub-
ject of substantial criticism.119 
The first question was whether the state action at issue had 
a secular purpose under the first prong of the Lemon Test.120  The 
school board offered three purposes for the statute: “(1) to en-
courage informed freedom of belief, (2) to disclaim any orthodoxy 
of belief that could be inferred from the exclusive placement of 
evolution in the curriculum, and (3) to reduce offense to the sen-
 
 116 Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 117 Id.  After the Fifth Circuit issued this opinion, the court acknowledged that it in-
correctly quoted the disclaimer but denied a petition for rehearing en banc.  Freiler v. 
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir. 2000).  The following was the 
correct disclaimer: “It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic 
right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain beliefs taught 
by parents on this very important matter of the origin of life and matter.”  Id. 
 118 Freiler, 185 F.3d at 342.  
 119 Id. at 344.  The court cited a recent Supreme Court decision, which applied the 
Lemon Test to support its conclusion that the Lemon Test remains legally viable: 
[T]he Supreme Court laid to rest rumors of the Lemon test’s demise . . . .  The 
Court acknowledged the continued viability of the general Lemon principles 
used to evaluate whether government action violates the Establishment 
Clause and noted in particular that the nature of the inquiry under Lemon’s 
purpose prong has “remained largely unchanged.”  
Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997)).  See also supra note 54 and ac-
companying text. 
 120 Freiler, 185 F.3d at 344. 
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sibilities and sensitivities of any student or parent caused by the 
teaching of evolution.”121  The court had to determine whether 
the disclaimer furthered the stated purposes of the school 
board.122  If the disclaimer furthered one articulated purpose and 
that purpose was secular, the disclaimer would not violate the 
secular purpose test.123  The court held that the disclaimer failed 
to further freedom of belief because the disclaimer told students 
that evolutionism did not have to affect what they already know, 
and this violated the principle of critical thinking.124  The court 
concluded that the disclaimer did further the other two stated 
purposes of disclaiming orthodoxy and decreasing the offense of 
parents,125 and the court held that these were both secular pur-
poses.126 
The court next had to determine whether the disclaimer con-
veyed a message of endorsement or approval in violation of the 
second prong of the Lemon Test.127  The court held that the dis-
claimer primarily protected a particular religious belief, which 
was the Biblical view of creation.128  Three factors in the dis-
claimer led the court to this conclusion: 
(1) the juxtaposition of the disavowal of endorsement of evolution with 
an urging that students contemplate alternative theories of the origin 
of life; (2) the reminder that students have the right to maintain be-
liefs taught by their parents regarding the origin of life; and (3) the 
“Biblical version of Creation” as the only alternative theory explicitly 
referenced in the disclaimer.129 
The court concluded that the disclaimer as a whole encouraged 
students to meditate upon religion in general and the Biblical 
narrative specifically.130  Although introducing religious concepts 
in schools would not be prima facie unconstitutional, there is a 
clear difference between comparative religion classes or history 
classes and the disclaimer at issue,131 because the disclaimer 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. (“In undertaking such a ‘sham’ inquiry, we consider whether the disclaimer 
furthers the particular purposes articulated by the School Board or whether the dis-
claimer contravenes those avowed purposes.”) (citation omitted). 
 123 Id. (“If the disclaimer furthers just one of its proffered purposes and if that same 
purpose proves to be secular, then the disclaimer survives scrutiny under Lemon’s first 
prong.”). 
 124 Id. at 345. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 346 (“Lemon’s second prong asks whether, irrespective of the School Board’s 
actual purpose, ‘the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or 
disapproval.’”) (quoting Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 
1999)). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 347. 
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does not provide understanding of different religions.132  The 
court concluded that the disclaimer violated the second prong of 
the Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test because it advanced 
religion.133 
The court in this case reached the correct holding for the 
wrong reasons.  It is acceptable (and in fact necessary) for schools 
to teach alternatives to evolutionism in science classes because it 
is important for schools to offer diverse perspectives on issues in-
stead of just imposing one view on students.  Teaching different 
perspectives on the origins of life would not advance religion any 
more than teaching the pro-life and pro-choice positions on abor-
tion would somehow advance the pro-life position.134  If directly 
teaching so-called religious alternatives in the curriculum would 
not advance religion, then the infinitely more conservative step of 
reading a disclaimer would surely not advance religion in the 
way that the court describes.  However, the school district may 
have been advancing the religion of secular humanism through 
its failure to teach alternatives as an actual part of the curricu-
lum.  If the disclaimer violated the Establishment Clause, it is 
only because it did not go far enough in presenting actual alter-
natives to secular humanism in science classes. 
E.  Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District 
In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania heard Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 
which involved a disclaimer about evolutionary theory that the 
School District required teachers to read to students in ninth-
grade biology classes.135  The court held that the disclaimer was 
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause136 as it 
failed both the Endorsement Test and the Lemon Test.137   
There was one element of the court’s reasoning in this case 
that was particularly significant.  Like all of the previous court 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 348. 
 134 The court explicitly states in its opinion that teaching comparative religion would 
be acceptable.  Id. at 347 (“[I]t might well be said that one’s education is not complete 
without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to 
the advancement of civilization.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).  Teaching evolution and its alternatives is no differ-
ent from comparative religion, since both compare the religion of secular humanism 
against others.  The failure to recognize that science classes are currently advancing relig-
ion legitimizes the exclusion and indoctrination. 
 135 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 136 Id. at 764–65. 
 137 Id. at 765.  Most of the court’s analysis centered on the facts of the specific dis-
claimer in this case, which is not particularly relevant to this article since such disclaim-
ers are a much weaker version of what this article proposes. 
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decisions that have dealt with evolutionism, the determining is-
sue in this case was whether the alternative theory at issue was 
a scientific theory.138  The court held that intelligent design is not 
science.139  Intelligent design violates the rules of the scientific 
discipline that have excluded the possibility of supernatural cau-
sation since the 16th and 17th centuries.140  Science intentionally 
excludes questions relating to the meaning and purpose of the 
world, and supernatural explanations are not scientific.141  “This 
self-imposed convention of science, which limits inquiry to test-
able, natural explanations about the natural world, is referred to 
by philosophers as ‘methodological naturalism’ and is sometimes 
known as the scientific method.”142  The court reasoned that in-
cluding supernatural explanations is a “science stopper” because 
“once you attribute a cause to an untestable supernatural force, a 
proposition that cannot be disproven, there is no reason to con-
tinue seeking natural explanations as we have our answer.”143  
The court pointed out that every major scientific association that 
has considered the question has concluded that intelligent design 
is not science.144  The court, therefore, held that intelligent design 
 
 138 Id. at 738 (“[Intelligent Design’s] failure to meet the ground rules of science is suf-
ficient for the Court to conclude that it is not science . . . .”); id. at 765 (“[T]he Board’s ID 
Policy violates the Establishment Clause.  In making this determination, we have ad-
dressed the seminal question of whether ID is science.  We have concluded that it is not, 
and moreover that ID cannot uncouple itself from its creationist, and thus religious, ante-
cedents.”). 
 139 Id. at 735. 
 140 Id.  The court’s conclusion is factually incorrect.  The approaches of scientists to 
the scientific method have been far more diverse than the court describes.  Sir Isaac New-
ton (1642–1727), one of history’s most important scientists, is an excellent example.   
[S]cientists and historians are trying to reconcile the Isaac Newton they 
thought they knew with the Isaac Newton they’re discovering in his private 
papers. 
  . . . . 
  Only recently made available to the public, at the National Library in Je-
rusalem, these documents are now revealing that for Newton, religion and sci-
ence were inseparable, two parts of the same life-long quest to understand the 
universe. 
  Newton himself wanted to design a universe in which God was absolutely 
present and absolutely powerful.  There’s an enormous irony there.  In the 18th 
century, gangs of interpreters, most of them French, will take the God out of 
Newton’s world.  It’s a very common image of what the Newtonian world was, 
that it was soulless, that it was mechanical, that it really wasn’t theologically 
motivated at all.   
  Now, ironically, that’s very anti-Newtonian, because Newton argued that 
God had to be present, you couldn’t read him out of the universe. 
NOVA: Newton’s Dark Secrets, (PBS television broadcast Nov. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3217_newton.html.   
 141 See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735.   
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 736. 
 144 Id. at 737. 
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“fails to meet the essential ground rules that limit science to 
testable, natural explanations.”145 
The court only proves one truth through its reasoning in this 
case.  If one relies on an exclusively materialistic definition of 
science, one will necessarily classify anything that is supernatu-
ral as unscientific.  The question is whether there is any basis for 
the presupposition that science must be exclusively materialistic 
in its inferences.  As has already been discussed, the materialis-
tic conception of the scientific method entails as much faith as 
the non-materialistic approach to the scientific method.146  Even 
if every scientist on the planet endorsed the materialistic ap-
proach to the scientific method, it would not become any more 
verifiable. 
The court argued that allowing supernatural explanations 
would be a “science stopper” since it would destroy the need to 
search for natural explanations.  This is logically untrue.  The 
materialistic approach to the scientific method allows for only 
natural theories.  The non-materialistic approach to the scientific 
method allows for both natural theories and supernatural theo-
ries.  Under the non-materialistic approach, people will be just as 
free to search for natural explanations as they are under the ma-
terialistic approach.  Both theories have the goal of increasing 
knowledge about the sensible world.  The existence of a super-
natural theory will not stop people from searching for other pos-
sible natural theories.  However, even if this were a risk, there is 
an equal risk that the materialistic approach to the scientific 
method could produce absurd theories in a desperate attempt to 
find a materialistic explanation where no reasonable one exists.  
Regardless of how one resolves these practical questions, it will 
not implicate the ultimate position at issue here, which is that 
belief in either approach to the scientific method requires faith.  
The fact that a certain method appears to be practical does not 
necessarily mean that it is true. 
III.  ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND SECULAR HUMANISM 
The current precedents of the federal courts concerning the 
teaching of evolutionism in public schools violate the Establish-
ment Clause.  The First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion . . . .”147  The Lemon Test is the primary legal 
standard that the federal courts have applied in recent evolution-
 
 145 Id. at 738. 
 146 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
 147 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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ism cases to determine whether state actions violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.148  Therefore, the Lemon Test will be applied to 
determine whether the failure to incorporate alternatives to evo-
lutionary theory in public school science classes violates the Es-
tablishment Clause. 
The Lemon Test requires that: “First, the statute must have 
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; fi-
nally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion.’”149  The failure to include alternatives 
to evolutionary theory is unconstitutional under the second prong 
of the Lemon Test.  The second prong of the Lemon Test requires 
neutrality toward religion.  In Epperson, the Court held: 
Government . . . must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doc-
trine, and practice.  It may not be hostile to any religion or to the ad-
vocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one relig-
ion or religious theory against another or even against the militant 
opposite.  The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality 
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonre-
ligion.150 
Therefore, since neutrality is the legal standard, the issue 
here is whether exclusively teaching evolutionism in science 
classes is neutral toward religion. 
Primary and secondary public education is a special setting 
for the application of the Establishment Clause.151  When fami-
lies place their children in the public education system, they ex-
pect that the school will not indoctrinate their children with be-
lief systems that conflict with their own beliefs.152  Additionally, 
the state exerts substantial coercive power with mandatory at-
tendance requirements.153  Many families do not have the re-
sources to seek out alternative educational arrangements for 
their children.  The unique setting of public education demands 
elevated concern because of the risk of indoctrination that is in-
 
 148 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83 (1987); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of 
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (D. Ark. 1982); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 
185 F.3d 337, 344 (5th Cir. 1999); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 765. 
 149 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 150 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); id. at 104 (“As early as 1872, 
this Court said: ‘The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect.’”) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 
(1871)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an-
other.”). 
 151 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583–84. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 584. 
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herent in public education. 
The Supreme Court has established precedents that help de-
termine when teaching religion in public schools is neutral.  In 
Zorach v. Clauson, the Court found that a state violates the prin-
ciple of religious neutrality if it engages in religious instruction 
that only represents the views of a particular sect.154  The Court 
held in Epperson that the state violates the principle of neutral-
ity if it tailors education to the principles or prohibitions of a par-
ticular religious group or dogma.155  On the other hand, in School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Supreme Court 
held that an education is incomplete without classes on the his-
tory of religion or comparative religion.156  Public schools can in-
tegrate study of the Bible and religion when presented objec-
tively.157  The key principle for the Court is neutrality.  Public 
schools can educate students about religion, but they cannot side 
with particular beliefs when educating about religion. 
Secular humanism is a religion under the Establishment 
Clause.  The Supreme Court held in Epperson that the require-
ment of neutrality between different religious sects, and between 
religion and nonreligion, is central to the Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.158  The necessary implication of this princi-
ple is that the state cannot favor secular humanism over theistic 
religious beliefs.  The Supreme Court has held that secularism is 
a religion in a few cases, including School District of Abington 
Township.159  “We agree of course that the State may not estab-
 
 154 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).  
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruc-
tion nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to 
force one or some religion on any person. . . .  The government must be neutral 
when it comes to competition between sects.  It may not thrust any sect on any 
person. . . .  It may not coerce anyone to . . . take religious instruction. 
Id.  
 155 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106 (“There is and can be no doubt that the First Amend-
ment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to 
the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”); id. at 106–07 (“It forbids 
alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed 
antagonistic to a particular dogma.”). 
 156 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[O]ne’s education is not complete without a study of 
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of 
civilization.”).  The Court is not indicating here that schools cannot teach religion in sci-
ence classes; it merely used religion classes as an example.  What is important is the un-
derlying principle, which says that it is perfectly fine to incorporate religion in public 
school curriculum as long as the presentation is neutral. 
 157 Id. (“Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of relig-
ion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be ef-
fected consistently with the First Amendment.”). 
 158 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103–04. 
 159 374 U.S. at 225; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among relig-
ions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the 
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and oth-
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lish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively oppos-
ing or showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who be-
lieve in no religion over those who do believe.’”160  Additionally, a 
long line of Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases have held 
that non-theistic beliefs like atheism fall within the definition of 
religion under the First Amendment.161  Therefore, secular hu-
manism is a religion under the First Amendment. 
The exclusive teaching of evolutionary theory in public 
schools is an advancement of the religion of secular humanism.  
There is an inherent connection between evolutionary theory and 
the secular humanist worldview.  Secular humanists generally 
reject knowledge that science cannot test.162  Since one cannot di-
rectly test the supernatural, secular humanists inevitably adopt 
a naturalistic worldview, which is the belief that there is only a 
natural realm and no supernatural.163  Any secular humanist 
theory about the origin of life cannot rely on the supernatural be-
cause that would be inconsistent with naturalism.  Therefore, 
there is an inherent link between secular humanism and evolu-
tionary theory because evolutionism is an exclusively materialis-
tic theory about the origin of life.164 
Some critics may question why teaching evolutionism would 
advance secular humanism if some theistic religious groups also 
believe in evolutionism.165  There are two answers.  First, even if 
 
ers.”).  See also Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 (“To hold that it may not would be to find in the 
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious 
groups.  That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do be-
lieve.”); id. (“But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for gov-
ernment to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effec-
tive scope of religious influence.”); id. at 315 (“We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such 
a philosophy of hostility to religion.”). 
 160 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314). 
 161 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (“At one time it was thought that 
this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would 
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a 
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. . . .  [T]he Court has unambiguously con-
cluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment em-
braces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 
(“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can con-
stitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’” (quoting Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 33 U.S. 1, 15 (1947))); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has adopted a broad definition of ‘religion’ that includes non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as theistic ones.”); Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 
F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘[R]eligion’ includes antipathy to religion. . . .  If we think 
of religion as taking a position on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.”). 
 162 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 31 (“We are skeptical of untested 
claims to knowledge . . . .”). 
 163 Council for Secular Humanism, supra note 30 (“Secular humanists accept a world 
view or philosophy called naturalism, in which the physical laws of the universe are not 
superseded by non-material or supernatural entities . . . .”). 
 164 KURTZ, supra note 39, at 28. 
 165 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 765 (M.D. Pa. 2005) 
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it is possible for evolutionary theory to be consistent with the be-
liefs of some groups, science classes do not teach this form of evo-
lutionism.  Science classes generally teach evolutionism with no 
supernatural element.  Therefore, whether evolutionism can be 
theoretically reconciled with religion is irrelevant since science 
classes rarely teach that permutation of evolutionism and relig-
ion.  Second, even if evolutionism, as taught in science classes, 
complements the beliefs of some religious groups, there is still a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, since the exclusive teach-
ing of evolutionism would advance the beliefs of some Christian 
religious denominations over the beliefs of other Christian reli-
gious denominations.  The legal standard explicitly requires gov-
ernment neutrality between religious sects.166  Teaching evolu-
tionary theory exclusively in public school science classes would 
advance the religious beliefs of Christian religious groups that 
believe in a non-literal interpretation of Genesis, and it would 
discriminate against Christian religious groups that believe in a 
literal interpretation of Genesis. 
Some people may wonder why it is necessary to teach alter-
natives to evolutionism in science classes instead of in religion or 
social studies classes.  There are a few reasons.  First, indoctrina-
tion in science classes is uniquely dangerous because of how the 
norms of the scientific discipline mask its religious content.  Only 
directly teaching alternatives in science classes will make stu-
dents aware of ideological content.  Second, even if schools of-
fered religion classes, they would likely not have the same status 
as science classes since they would probably be electives instead 
of required courses.  Third, science teachers generally present 
evolutionary theory as uncontested truth.  It is unlikely that su-
pernatural religious beliefs would get the same uncontested 
status if taught in other classes.  Fourth, the exclusion of super-
natural theories from science classes marginalizes religious be-
lief.  It creates the impression that secular humanism is a practi-
cal device that allows people to understand the world today, and 
religion is only an object of historical study concerning some de-
 
(“Both Defendants and many of the leading proponents of ID make a bedrock assumption 
which is utterly false.  Their presupposition is that evolutionary theory is antithetical to a 
belief in the existence of a supreme being and to religion in general.”). 
 166 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).  
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruc-
tion nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to 
force one or some religion on any person. . . .  The government must be neutral 
when it comes to competition between sects.  It may not thrust any sect on any 
person. . . .  It may not coerce anyone to . . . take religious instruction. 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). 
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ranged people of the past.  It also marginalizes religion by creat-
ing the implicit assumption that religion has nothing to say 
about science.  Fifth, would it be objectionable to teach the non-
materialistic approach to the scientific method and creation sci-
ence exclusively in science classes and to teach secular human-
ism in social studies?  If there is truly no marginalization that 
occurs through just teaching the materialistic scientific method 
and evolutionism in science classes, then there should be no ob-
jection to a reversal of this situation. 
A few cases have specifically addressed whether teaching 
evolutionism exclusively in science classes violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, and all of the cases have held that it does not.  
In 1972, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas heard Wright v. Houston Independent School District.167  
The plaintiff sought an injunction that would prohibit the School 
District and the State Board of Education from teaching evolu-
tionism without critical analysis and alternative theories.168  The 
plaintiffs argued that evolutionary theory was contrary to the 
Bible, and that the uncritical presentation of evolutionism in sci-
ence classes was, therefore, a direct attack on their religious be-
liefs by the state, which violated the Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause.169  The plaintiffs argued that the state 
was establishing a secular religion through its uncritical presen-
tation of evolutionism,170 and that the teaching of evolutionism 
was directly contrary to the principle of legal neutrality that the 
Supreme Court established in Epperson.171 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim.172  Arkansas pro-
moted religion by legislative means in Epperson, but there was 
no official state or school district policy, which required that 
teachers only teach evolutionism.173  The court did not think it 
was significant that the textbooks had a bias in favor of evolu-
tionism.174  “This Court has been cited to no case in which so 
nebulous an intrusion upon the principle of religious neutrality 
has been condemned by the Supreme Court.”175  There was no 
evidence that students could not challenge their teacher’s presen-
tation of evolutionism, and the law in Epperson prohibited dis-
 
 167 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
 168 Id. at 1208. 
 169 See id. at 1209. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 1210. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. 
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cussion of evolutionism.176 
The court concluded that that there was an insufficient con-
nection between the First Amendment concept of religion and 
evolutionism.177  Science and religion deal with similar issues 
and sometimes have conflicting opinions, but the government 
cannot prohibit ideas that are contrary to a particular religious 
belief.178  Teachers cannot stop discussing every scientific issue 
where a religion has a conflicting belief.179  Offering equal time to 
all theories is not a solution to the problem.  Every religion in the 
world has a belief about the origin of life, and there is no way to 
decide which theories to teach.180  The court concluded that the 
proposed solutions would create more problems than they at-
tempted to solve.181 
There are a number of problems with the court’s analysis.  
The court claimed that nothing in Epperson indicated that the 
bias in this case was significant enough to justify holding it un-
constitutional, but the Court in Epperson stated directly that a 
“[s]tate may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools 
or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion.  This prohibition is 
absolute.”182  Additionally, it is true that there was a legislative 
action in Epperson, but there is no reason why a legislative ac-
tion or school district policy is necessary.  The quoted statement 
above indicates that Epperson prohibits “practices,” and that 
there could still be an unconstitutional state action even without 
an official policy.  The fact that the actions of the state of Arkan-
sas were worse in Epperson than the actions of the Houston 
School District does not make the actions of the Houston School 
District constitutional since the prohibition against bias in edu-
cation is absolute under Epperson. 
The court argued that science and religion deal with similar 
topics, and that the government cannot prohibit everything in 
science that conflicts with religious beliefs.183  This statement 
demonstrates yet again that courts justify the exclusion of alter-
native perspectives by masking secular humanism with scientific 
discourse.  Furthermore, if one assumes that an issue that comes 
up in science class is a point of strong ideological disagreement 
because it conflicts with religious beliefs, it would make sense to 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 1211. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 183 Wright, 366 F. Supp. at 1211. 
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include alternative perspectives on that issue. 
The court stated that equal time is not feasible because there 
are too many theories.184  Is there any other place in public edu-
cation where this would be a legitimate excuse?  A teacher could 
not simply state: “We do not have time to teach both the pro-life 
and pro-choice positions this semester so we are just going to 
teach you the pro-choice perspective.  After all, in the abortion 
literature alone, there are at least thousands of different view-
points on the issue.”  This clearly does not justify failing to make 
a good faith effort to include diverse perspectives.  Maybe this 
argument would be more credible if schools taught two perspec-
tives instead of one.  It is possible to offer students the big pic-
ture on these issues.  There are many theories, but there are 
common themes that schools can teach in a significantly more in-
clusive manner than singular indoctrination. 
In 1980, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard Crowley v. 
Smithsonian Institution.185  The appellants in that case filed a 
civil action against the Smithsonian Institution in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia because the 
Smithsonian presented two exhibits involving evolutionary the-
ory.186  “The 1978 exhibit, the ‘Emergence of Man,’ is described in 
an accompanying pamphlet as ‘the story of how, when and where 
modern human beings evolved from homonid ancestors who lived 
millions of years ago.’”187  The appellants argued that advocating 
the theory of evolutionism was unconstitutional support for the 
religion of secular humanism, and they requested an injunction 
that would either prohibit funding for evolutionism or require 
equal funding for Biblical creationism.188 
The D.C. Circuit rejected the claim that the exhibits estab-
lished a religion of secular humanism.  Although the exhibits re-
ferred to evolutionism, they did not refer to evolutionism as the 
only credible theory about the origin of life, nor did they mention 
anything about religion or secular humanism.189  The exhibits did 
nothing to disparage any religious belief.190  Even if evolutionary 
theory relied on faith instead of scientific proof, as the appellants 
claimed, that would not by itself prove that the evolutionism ex-
hibits established a religion of secular humanism.191  One cannot 
infer that anything one believes on faith is a religion simply be-
 
 184 Id. 
 185 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 186 Id. at 740. 
 187 Id. at 741. 
 188 Id. at 740. 
 189 Id. at 741. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 742. 
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cause some religions rely on faith.192  The involvement of the gov-
ernment in an area of importance to religious believers does not 
mean that the activity is supporting a religion.193  For example, 
government advocacy supporting or opposing abortion would not 
establish a religion even though there are religious concerns at 
stake in the issue.194  “[I]t does not follow that a statute violates 
the Establishment Clause because it ‘happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’”195  The court 
also pointed to past precedents that support diffusion of scientific 
knowledge and prohibit any special protection for religious 
groups from the competition that comes from scientific informa-
tion.196  The court affirmed the decision of the district court con-
cluding that that the exhibits did not establish a religion of secu-
lar humanism.197 
There are a few problems with the court’s reasoning in Crow-
ley.  The court states that even if evolutionism is unverifiable, 
that alone does not make it a religious belief.198  This is true, but 
evolutionism is a religion because it takes a position on an issue 
that has always been at the center of religious belief systems, i.e., 
the origin of life and the universe.  It is an advancement of relig-
ion when the government adopts a distinctly materialistic belief 
about the origin of life that directly conflicts with other religious 
beliefs.  The court reasons that evolution is not a religion just be-
cause it coincides with the beliefs of secular humanism.  How-
ever, there is a distinction between regulating morals and sup-
porting doctrine.  A state can prohibit murder, but a state cannot 
coerce people into believing that murder is wrong because God 
prohibits it.  The Seventh Circuit has found that taking a posi-
tion on divinity, whether affirming or denying, is itself a religious 
belief.199  Similarly, taking a position on the origin of life is a reli-
gious belief regardless of the position that one takes since this is-
sue is at the heart of religious belief. 
The court arbitrarily creates a higher burden of proof in this 
case for theistic religious belief than for non-theistic religious be-
lief.  In some federal cases, the courts have held that a mere ref-
 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). 
 196 Id. at 744. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 742. 
 199 See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Court has 
adopted a broad definition of ‘religion’ that includes non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as 
well as theistic ones.”); Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“‘[R]eligion’ includes antipathy to religion. . . .  If we think of religion as taking a position 
on divinity, then atheism is indeed a form of religion.”). 
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erence “to creation out of nothing” is by itself an advancement of 
religion, but the federal courts will not infer that a purely mate-
rialistic evolutionary process is an advancement of the religion of 
secular humanism.200  In the context of theistic religion, mere 
correlation is enough to prove a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.  In the context of non-theistic religion, only explicit en-
dorsement is sufficient for the courts.  The federal courts violate 
the principle of religious neutrality when they require a higher 
degree of proof to demonstrate an establishment of theistic relig-
ion than is required to demonstrate an establishment of secular 
humanism. 
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Peloza v. 
Capistrano Unified School District.201  The plaintiff, a high school 
biology teacher, sued the school district, arguing that evolution-
ism is a religion, and that forcing him to teach evolutionism was, 
among other things, a violation of the Establishment Clause.202  
He argued that evolutionism is a religion that relies on chance 
instead of a creator to explain the origin of life.203  The court ap-
plied the Lemon Test to determine whether there was a violation 
of the Establishment Clause.204  The court held that exclusively 
teaching evolutionism does not establish a religion because the 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have never held that evo-
lutionism or secular humanism are religions under the Estab-
lishment Clause, and the weight of the precedent and the dic-
tionary definition are to the contrary.205  The court also stated 
 
 200 Compare Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (“The preeminent pur-
pose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a 
supernatural being created humankind.”), and McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 
1255, 1265 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“The argument that creation from nothing in 4(a)(1) does not 
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational support.  To the contrary, 
‘creation out of nothing’ is a concept unique to Western religions.  In traditional Western 
religious thought, the conception of a creator of the world is a conception of God.”), and 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A]nyone 
familiar with Western religious thought would immediately make the association that the 
tactically unnamed designer is God . . . .”), with Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 
37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Only if we define ‘evolution’ and ‘evolutionism’ as does 
Peloza as a concept that embraces the belief that the universe came into existence without 
a Creator might he make out a claim.”), and Crowley, 636 F.2d at 741 (“The concept of 
evolution was referred to in these exhibits. . . .  The exhibits did not mention religion in 
general or Secular Humanism in particular.  Neither by their terms nor by implication 
did the exhibits disparage religion or any religious tenet.”), and Wright v. Houston Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (“Plaintiffs’ case depends in large 
measure upon their demonstrating a connection between ‘religion,’ as employed in the 
first amendment, and Defendants’ approach to the subject of evolution.  The Court is con-
vinced that the connection is too tenuous a thread on which to base a first amendment 
complaint.”). 
 201 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 202 Id. at 519. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 520. 
 205 Id. at 521. 
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that the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Edwards v. Aguillard 
that evolutionism is not a religion.206  Finally, the court con-
cluded that evolutionary theory is a scientific theory arrived at 
through scientific study, and that it is not a religion.207 
The court’s conclusion that secular humanism is not a relig-
ion under the Establishment Clause is problematic.  After all, the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated in two cases that secularism is a 
religion,208 and held in two cases that atheism is a religion.209  
The Ninth Circuit only cited two Federal Circuit cases in support 
of its position, and neither case supports the court’s position.  
The first case cited by the court was Smith v. Board of School 
Commissioners.210  In Smith, the court concluded at the outset of 
the case that it did not need to rule on whether secular human-
ism was a religion because the facts in that specific case could 
not prove a violation of the Establishment Clause even if secular 
humanism were a religion.211  The holding in Smith does not sup-
port the conclusion that secular humanism is not a religion. 
The court’s second citation was to a quotation from Laurence 
Tribe in United States v. Allen, which concluded that courts 
 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 521–22. 
 208 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[T]he State 
may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or show-
ing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do 
believe.’” (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952))); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not teach what 
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, 
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.”).  See also Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, at 314 
(“To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the gov-
ernment show a callous indifference to religious groups.  That would be preferring those 
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.”); id. (“But we find no constitutional 
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to 
throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”); id. at 
315 (“We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.”). 
 209  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–53 (1985) (“At one time it was thought that 
this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect over another, but would 
not require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a 
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism. . . .  [T]he Court has unambiguously con-
cluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment em-
braces the right to select any religious faith or none at all.”); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 
(“We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can con-
stitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’” (quoting Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ., 33 U.S. 1, 15 (1947))). 
 210 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.5 (citing Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684, 690–
95 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
 211 See Smith, 827 F.2d at 689.  
The Supreme Court has never established a comprehensive test for determin-
ing the “delicate question” of what constitutes a religious belief for purposes of 
the first amendment, and we need not attempt to do so in this case, for we find 
that, even assuming that secular humanism is a religion for purposes of the es-
tablishment clause, Appellees have failed to prove a violation . . . . 
Id.  
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should consider anything that is arguably non-religious to be not 
a religion under the Establishment Clause.212  The court in Allen 
stated that it did not even fully agree with the quotation from 
Tribe, but in that case, the court found it helpful since the issue 
was whether possession of nuclear weapons by the federal gov-
ernment was a religion.213  In light of all of the Supreme Court 
precedent holding that both secularism and atheism are relig-
ions, it is difficult to understand how the Ninth Circuit reached 
the conclusion that secular humanism is not a religion. 
The Ninth Circuit also advanced a dictionary definition that 
said that religion includes belief in the supernatural.214  Supreme 
Court precedent clearly has more legal authority than Webster’s 
Dictionary on the meaning of the First Amendment.215  In addi-
tion, if the Ninth Circuit had considered the implication of this 
definition for situations beyond this single case, the court, with-
out question, would not have advanced this definition.  Making 
belief in the supernatural the definition of religion would exclude 
atheists and agnostics from the protection of the First Amend-
ment since the First Amendment only protects the free exercise 
of religion.216 
The court also pointed to the holding of Edwards v. Aguil-
lard to support its conclusion that evolutionism is not a religion 
under the First Amendment.217  However, the court failed to cite 
a specific page number in Edwards that supports this conclu-
sion.218  The reason that the court could not cite a particular page 
is that the Supreme Court never specifically addressed the issue 
of whether evolution is a religion.  However, the Ninth Circuit 
may have assumed that it was implied in Edwards.  In any case, 
it is ultimately irrelevant whether Edwards  held that evolution-
 
 212 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.5 (citing United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 450–51 (2d 
Cir. 1985)). 
 213 See Allen, 760 F.2d at 450–51 (“Although we need not follow him to that extreme 
in this opinion—supporting nuclear armaments being a good deal more than ‘arguably’ 
non-religious—we find his analysis helpful and provocative.”). 
 214 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 n.4 (“According to Webster’s, religion is the ‘belief in and 
reverence for a supernatural power accepted as the creator and governor of the uni-
verse.’”). 
 215 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 216 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).  Note that the word religion is 
used only once in the First Amendment, which means that it would be nearly impossible 
to arrive at different definitions of religion for the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses.  Therefore, the logical implication of the court’s dictionary definition is that it 
would be constitutional to pass laws prohibiting atheism and agnosticism. 
 217 Peloza, 37 F.3d at 521 (“The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that while the 
belief in a divine creator of the universe is a religious belief, the scientific theory that 
higher forms of life evolved from lower forms is not.”) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 
U.S. 578 (1987)). 
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ism is not a religion since the Supreme Court should overturn 
Edwards by holding that failure to teach alternatives to evolu-
tionism violates the Establishment Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The public education system and the courts have systemati-
cally excluded alternatives to evolutionary theory from public 
school science classes.  The primary rationale for excluding alter-
natives to evolutionism is the idea that supernatural religious be-
liefs do not belong in science classes because they are unscien-
tific.  This reasoning is nothing more than a façade because the 
materialistic scientific method that legitimizes the exclusion of 
alternatives to evolutionary theory is just as unverifiable as be-
lief in the supernatural.  The hegemony of the materialistic ap-
proach to the scientific method has allowed the religion of secular 
humanism to flourish in public school science classes under the 
mask of scientific objectivity.  Only recognition of the faith-based 
assumptions that are inherent in both the materialistic and non-
materialistic scientific methods will create the possibility of end-
ing the unjust indoctrination that is plaguing public schools. 
Teaching evolutionism without alternative theories in public 
school science classes advances and establishes the religion of 
secular humanism.  The legal standard is neutrality, and exclud-
ing alternatives to evolutionism could not be a more explicit vio-
lation of this standard.  The state is compelling students to at-
tend science classes that engage in religious instruction.  
Epperson is the only evolutionism case that reached the right 
holding for the right reason.  The Court correctly held that neu-
trality toward religion was the standard, and a statute that pro-
hibited the teaching of evolutionism was not neutral, which 
proves that the true constitutional standard is to teach either all 
or none.  Subsequent federal court cases, which have dealt with 
the issue of evolutionism, violate the principle of neutrality con-
tained in the Lemon Test because they have the effect of advanc-
ing the religion of secular humanism. 
